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Abstract 
 
 
Weak governance adversely affects firm’s net worth and consequently the value of its 
collateral.  This negative impact on the collateral reduces the external credit available for 
importing inputs constraining potential output. As a result, a stronger procyclical monetary 
policy stance is adopted for protecting the exchange rate and hence arresting the degradation 
in the collateral constraint. 
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1. Introduction
The existence of a procyclical monetary policy in emerging economies is at odds with that of the developed
world. Amongst other reasons, a large literature (Agénor and Montiel (2010) and Frankel (2010)) explains
this odd feature by focusing on the theme of the impact of a currency depreciation on the revaluation of debt
and the ability to raise future external nancing. Another emerging, but limited, literature advances Norths
(1990) idea on governance and nds evidence that emerging markets which imitate the institutional features
of the developed economies tend to conduct countercyclical monetary policies (Calderón et al. (2004)).
Huang and Wei (2006) show that weak institutions limit the ability of the government to raise revenues and
subsequently limits monetary actions available to policy maker.
We believe that these two literatures are linked. Empirically, this connection is motivated by Figure. 1
below, which illustrates a negative relationship between monetary contractions (within a year of a balance-
of-payments shock) and governance for 12 emerging economies during 1996-2007. We proxy governance by
using factors such as rule of law, corruption, regulation and government e¤ectiveness1 .
In this paper, we are able to connect these two literatures by introducing governance at the rm level.
Particularly, we incorporate governanceas a direct input in rms production process à la Hall and Jones
(1999). In addition to this modied production function, we use a standard small open-economy model
where rms face external nancial constraints. Our model shows that the impact of a negative external
demand shock on the availability of external credit to rms is much worse with weak governance. In this
environment, an aggressive monetary contraction becomes even more important, as it is needed to achieve
exchange rate stability for moderating the deterioration of external credit available to rms which import
foreign inputs.
The following section presents the model, section 3 discusses the results while section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
Consider a small open economy model 2 consisting of a continuum of households h who consume foreign
and domestically produced goods, hold money and in exchange provide di¤erentiated labour at a pre-
determinedwage. The rm produces competitively a common nal good using an imported input, domestic
labor and governance.
The main innovation in this paper is the presence of governance in the production function. This can
be thought of as institutions, laws/regulations and security which support production and for which rms
pays a lump sum tax à la Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Loayza (1995). In addition, these government
policies directly a¤ect a rmsnet worth, which also serves as its collateral constraint. A binding collateral
constraint restricts the amount of external funds available for the purchase of the imported input that leads
to decline in potential output.
This setup is suitable for our purpose as emerging economies are known to be price-takers, lack governance
e¢ ciency and are vulnerable to external shocks (Frankel (2010) and Agénor and Montiel (2010)).
2.1. Firms
A representative rm j produces output from an imported intermediate input, I; di¤erentiated labour,
H; and Governance, G such that
Y (j) = AGH(j)I(j)1   ;+  < 1; (1)
where A denotes factor productivity. Total employment at rm j is H(j) = [
1R
0
H(j; i)
% 1
% di]
%
% 1 ; where
H(j; i) is rms j demand for i type of labour and % is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated
1A large shock is a 15% drop in the real exchange rate. We observed 14 such shocks in 12 countries during 1996-2007.
The data for World Banks governance gures of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008) and the remaining from World
Development Indicators.
2Our model is very much in the spirit of Devereux and Poon (2004).
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Figure 1: Monetary Contraction and Governance
labour. By minimizing labour costs
R 1
0
W (i)H(i)di , where W (i) is the wage for labour i. The inverse
demand for labour is
W (i) =W

H(i)
H
 1=%
(2)
where W = [
R 1
0
[W (i)1 %di]
1
1 % .
Each rm j pays a lump sum tax 	(j) so that G = 
Pm
1 	(j) where  2 (0; 1] is a governance e¢ -
ciency scale and with  < 1 the authorities have less than successfully translated tax revenue into e¤ective
governance. Given a representative-agent system, the governance bill is spread equally across rms so that
G = m	. Firms maximize prot  = PhY  WH   SI   1mG; subject to (1), where Ph; W; S; denote
the output price, an aggregate wage index and the nominal exchange rate respectively. This results in the
well-known price equation
Ph = 
W(S)1  
A(m)
; =
1
(1    )1   ; (3)
Procyclical Monetary Policy and Governance 4
with the di¤erence that  = q= is the e¤ectiveprice of the foreign input where q is the actual price
in foreign currency while 1= is a governance markup. Therefore,  < 1 raise the cost-of-doing-business
reected in the price (see De Soto (1989) for practical examples).
The collateral constraint on the purchase of the intermediate input is
SI =
q

SI 6 N   SD: (4)
Eq. (4) says that the credit extended for the purchase of foreign input can not exceed rms net worth: the
di¤erence between net domestic assets, N , and existing foreign currency liabilities D: In the region where
(4) binds the maximum foreign input that can be nanced through credit is I = (N SDSq ) leading to a
constrained level of output
Y = AGH

(
N   SD
Sq
)
1  
(5)
2.2. The Household
A representative household h maximizes the following utility function
U(C;M;H) = ln(C(h)) +  ln(M(h)=P )  H(h)
1+
1 + 
; (6)
where ,  > 0 are constants,  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution and M(h)=P denote real money
holdings. She consumes foreign, Cf ; and domestically, Cd; produced goods so that C(h) = Cd (h)C
1 
f (h)
where  is the share of domestic goods in consumption. The budget constraint is
PC(h) +M(h) =W (h)H(h) +M0(h) + T (h) + ; (7)
where P; M0(h); T;  denote the general price level, initial money holding, transfers from the monetary
authority and prots from selling the nal good.
Maximizing (6) subject to (7) and (2) yields
Cd(h) = 
P
Pd
C(h); (8)
Cf (h) = (1  ) P
Pf
C(h); (9)
M(h) = PC(h); (10)
W (h) = 

%
%  1
 1
1+ 

1+

[E(M)1+]
1
1+ : (11a)
Eqs. (8) and (9) are the usual demand functions where P = (Pd )
(
Pf
1  )
(1 ) is the price index, and Pd
and Pf denote the prices of domestic and foreign goods. Money balances (10) reect the value of consumption.
The wage equation (11a) shows the usual market power of households arising from their monopolistic supply
of a di¤erentiated labour with elasticity %. We assume that wages are bargained at the beginning of the
period as a result they are conditioned on the expected money supply.
Procyclical Monetary Policy and Governance 5
2.3. Market Clearing
In a symmetric equilibrium the indices capturing households, h; and rms, j; drop out. In addition, all
markets clear. Money market clears so that money stock is the sum of previous nominal money balances
and transfers
M =M 1 + T (12)
The goods market equilibrium condition is
Y = Xd + 
PC
Ph
+
PCg
Ph
(13)
where Xd = X SPh is the unit-elastic foreign demand for locally produced goods and
X is the demand
shock. C and Cg are the composite households and government consumptions.
Assuming balanced budget so that expenditure equals revenue we have
PCg  m	
= G= (14)
These conditions together with rst-order-conditions solve for fPh; S; Y g conditioned on X and the preset
wage W:
2.4. Equilibrium for the non-binding region
When the collateral constraint is not binding our model replicates the Mundell-Flemming model. In this
case, the money demand equation (10) and rst-order-conditions give the following three equations in terms
of Ph; S and Y
Ph = 
W(S)1  
A(m)
(15)
M = 
W(Sq)1  
A(m)1 
Y (16)
Y =


(1    )

A(m)1 S
W(q)1  
(17)
The downward-sloping LM curve (16) in the S Y space is obtained from combining (15) and (10) where
a rise in S implies a depreciation in the local currency. (17) is the upward-sloping IS curve and obtained
from (13) and (15).
2.5. Equilibrium in the binding region
Using the IS curve in (5), the aggregate labour demand is
H = Y 1=A 1=G =

(
N   SD
Sq
)
+ 1

(18)
Aggregate labour demand positively depends on output and negatively on productivity, governance and
the collateral constraint. The household money demand equation, our LM curve here, is obtained using
(13) (10) and (4):
M = 
(
W

A 1=G =Y 1=

(
N   SD
Sq
)
+ 1

  (N   SD)  PCg
)
: (19)
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Higher wages, output raise households demand for money while the same is crowded out by both the
purchases of the foreign input (in the sense of a drain on net-foreign assets) as well as the expenditure on
governance by the government. Note that, an exchange rate depreciation triggers a rise in households
money demand through the following channels (19). First, the demand for the imported input falls and part
of it is substituted for by labour which in turn raises wages (see (18)). Second, the price of locally produced
good rises because (i) export demand increases owing to the depreciation and (ii) foreign inputs becoming
costlier.
By combining (18) and (13) we obtain the new IS equation:
Y 1= =

1  

XS   (N   SD)  (1  )PCg

G




N   SD
Sq
 1  

(20)
The wage equation is obtained using (11a), (10) and the budget constraint (7)
W =
 

1  1%
! 1
1+


1+

fE(M)1+g 11+ (21a)
Eq. (21a) reects the market power of households arising from the monopolistic supply of di¤erentiated
labour with elasticity % and as %!1, their market power disappears.
3. Results
For model parameter estimates below we draw from Liu (2008), Comin et al. (2009), Choudhary and
Levine (2006) and Devereux and Poon (2004) which provide useful evidence for developing countries.
Table 1. Parameter Values
Parameter Denition Value
 Labour share in production 0.5
 Imported input share in production 0.25
 Consumption share in home produced goods 0.65
 Substitution Elasticities between labour types 5
For our exercise we consider export demand X in three shock states: 0, -5% and -20% occurring with
probability 0.475, 0.475 and 0.05 with crash-state having the lowest likelihood. For each shock scenario we
consider four values of,  (1, 0.8, 0.6 and 0.4) and compute them for low, medium and high leverage ratios l
(0.25, 1.5 and 3)3 . Note that the binding region for (4) is where export demand collapses by 20% governance
is weak and leverage is high.
Using (15)-(17) for the non-binding region and (13)-(21a) we compute the expected4 output losses under
three policy arrangements: a xed exchange rate (ER), a xed money supply (MS) and their optimal mix
which is system-determined. In the xed exchange rate case, the monetary authorities adjust the money
supply to absorb external shocks to contain output losses. The exchange rate is xed to its pre-shock levels5
from (15)-(17) and consequently the collateral constraint does not bind. An alternative policy is to x
the money supply to its pre-shock levels, in (15)-(17) and (13)-(21a). Finally, a mathematically driven
intermediate policy mix of the two alternatives above. A mix that can not be directly implemented by the
policy maker.
3 l = SD
N SD ; from (4), is the ratio of foreign liabilities to net total assets.
4Expected according to state probabilities.
5Note that each  has its own equilibrium exchange rate.
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Table 2. Expected Output Losses
Fix ER Fix MS Optimal Mix
a b c d e f g h
 l = 0:25 l = 1:5 l = 3 l = 0:25 l = 1:5 l = 3
1 0.0715 0.0756 0.0774 0.0784 0.0648 0.0657 0.0661
0.8 0.1637 0.1703 0.1717 0.1726 0.0641 0.0650 0.0656
0.6 0.2744 0.2795 0.2807 0.2814 0.0629 0.0640 0.0646
0.4 0.3910 0.4098 0.4106 0.4111 0.0608 0.0620 0.0627
In Table 2 with perfect governance ( = 1) and highly leveraged rms (l = 3), a xed exchange rate leads
to a lower expected percentage output loss (column b) compared with a oating exchange policy (column
e). A mix of a monetary contraction together with a small depreciation is a superior policy option with
the least amount of output contraction (column h). For rms with low leverage ratios, a free-oat is a
better policy option. This is because for highly leveraged rms, a depreciation in the exchange rate limits
rmscredit availability to obtain the foreign input and produce output; a result consistent with Devereux
and Poon (2004). However, in Table 2 rows are not comparable to one another as each level of governance
implies a separate equilibrium.
Table 3. Governance and Money Supply Contraction
% Contraction in Money Supply
a b c d
 l = 0:25 l = 1:5 l = 3
1 2.4 2.4 2.6
0.8 2.9 3.0 3.1
0.6 3.7 3.8 3.9
0.4 5.8 5.8 5.8
In Table 3, we compute the required level of monetary contraction for the same expected percentage loss
of output at each level of . Given a high leverage ratio (column d) and worsening governance a greater
monetary contraction is required for same percentage loss in output. Indeed, weak governance lowers the
output potential reducing the value of the collateral, which makes it more likely for the collateral constraint
to bind. Consequently, a greater monetary contraction is required to protect the exchange rate, as a unit
drop in the currency is worse for the rm, in collateral terms.
Table 4. Gains per Unit of Contraction
ya yna
ma mna
 Average over leverage ratios l
1 0.46
0.8 0.39
0.6 0.35
0.4 0.21
a :a c t io n ; n a : in a c t io n
Alternatively, Table 4 shows the ratio of the di¤erence between expected output with and without policy
actions after an external shock. Once again as governance deteriorates a unit contraction is less e¤ective.
Together Tables 3 and 4 pin down the relationship between governance and procyclical monetary stance
for emerging markets explaining our empirical motivation in Fig 1.
4. Conclusion
By incorporating governance at the rm-level, we are able to explain the procyclical monetary stance
taken by emerging market central banks in response to a typical external demand shock.
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